Mfarmam: Making Money Your

and willowy blondes only take you so far, it turns out. Malefactors are punished. The universe is restored to balance.

This time, Gekko is a repentant father longing to make amends to win his daughter’s approval who also essentially steals a fortune from her to get back in the game.

Gekko is a humble reformed crook who has paid his debt to society and also a sleek alpha male puffing on a phallic cigar who can’t wait to gloat about his prowess at making money.

Gekko is a teacher who shares his knowledge. At times, one could swear that one had wandered into a parallel universe version of An Inconvenient Truth, as Gekko lectures us on the hazards of leverage and financial meltdown. Particularly priceless is when he calls a group of young students “ninjas”—no income, no job, no assets—adding, “You have a lot to look forward to.” But the same guy who observes that the mother of all evil is speculation turns up later in the film dressed in a power suit and giddy over his ability to turn $100 million into $1 billion. I don’t think he earned it at $25 an hour; leverage must have figured in there somewhere.

If we fast-forward 23 years to Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps, we are treated to a curiously different kind of moral equation, the morality of “and also” rather than “either or.”

In the new film, Gordon Gekko is a humble reformed crook who has paid his debt to society and also a sleek alpha male who can’t wait to gloat about his prowess at making money. (20th Century Fox)

This “and also” value system also comes across in Gekko’s attitude to innovation. He is clearly cynical about clean tech and derides the “fusion delusion” as the next bubble. In his words, “the only green is money.” Yet at the end of the film, he gives $100 million away to support alternative energy and do something “good” with his money.

• Randall Lane: Wall Street on Wall Street

• Randall Lane: Gordon Gekko’s Secret Revealed
The film’s title may hold its final moral clue. If money never sleeps, then can greed not be far behind, even in these pinched times? No one in the film seems to be hurting for nice apartments and clothes, for example, even with a financial meltdown that has come from “the mother of all bubbles.” As Gekko himself puts it, “Greed got greedier with a little envy thrown in.”

So we’d all like to find a little absolution in these troubled times, and in fact in the end Gekko’s daughter does melt and forgive him, while we on the other hand—adding up all the “and alsos”—don’t know whether to follow suit.

This “and also” value system comes across in Gekko’s attitude to innovation. He is cynical about clean tech, yet in the end, he gives $100 million to support alternative energy.

Gordon, make up your mind. Maybe a little therapy would help.

Dubbed "Mr. Creativity" by The Economist, John Kao is a contributing editor at The Daily Beast and an adviser to both public and private sector leaders. He is chairman of the Institute for Large Scale Innovation, whose i20 group is an association of national innovation "czars." He wrote Jamming: The Art and Discipline of Business Creativity, a BusinessWeek bestseller, and Innovation Nation. He is also a Tony-nominated producer of film and stage.

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One of the big problems during the financial crisis was a bank run in the shadow banking system when doubts emerged about the safety of deposits.

In my last column at the Fiscal Times, I talked about an approach to solving the problem that involves having deposits in the shadow system backed (insured) by high quality collateral.

But high quality collateral is not the only option. Another way to do this is through a type of insurance along the lines of what the FDIC does for the traditional banking system, along with restrictions on eligibility for the insurance. In reaction to my column, and in support of the insurance approach, Morgan Ricks of Harvard Law School emails:

I enjoyed your Fiscal Times piece and am glad you're focused on this issue.

I'm a big admirer of Gary and Andrew's work, but I would encourage you to give some more thought to whether collateral requirements for repo are likely to do the trick. Here are a few things to consider:

Many of the short-term liabilities of the shadow banking system were and are uncollateralized (think about Lehman's reliance on unsecured commercial paper -- the default of which caused the Reserve Fund to "break the buck," igniting the run on money market funds; and Citigroup's SIVs, which financed themselves in the unsecured markets).

Money market investors do not want to take possession of collateral and dispose of it. Even if the collateral is high quality, they don't want the interest rate risk. That's not their business. They don't want to deal with the consequences of a counterparty default. This is why, in the crisis, many money market investors stopped rolling even those repos that were fully secured by Treasuries and agencies:

See Chris Cox's testimony on Bear Stearns (here http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts040308cc.htm): "For the first time, a major investment bank that was well-capitalized and apparently fully liquid experienced a crisis of confidence that denied it not only unsecured financing, but short-term secured financing, even when the collateral consisted of agency securities with a market value in excess of the funds to be borrowed"

See also FRBNY's repo task force report (here http://www.newyorkfed.org/prc/report_100517.pdf): “Discussions in the Task Force emphasized repeatedly that many Cash Investors focus primarily if not almost exclusively on counterparty concerns and that they will withdraw secured funding on the same or very similar timeframes as they would withdraw unsecured funding.”

Even if collateral requirements reduce the likelihood of runs, how do we calibrate them -- what is the objective function? Presumably we think maturity transformation (fractional reserve banking) is a good thing -- it increases the supply of loanable funds by pooling otherwise idle cash reserves and deploying them toward productive investments. Risk constraints (such as collateral requirements) necessarily reduce this surplus -- there is a real social cost. How do we appraise the corresponding benefit? That is, how do we estimate the systemic instability associated with any given level of collateral requirements? My argument is that we can't. And by "we" I mean not just the government, but anybody.

My paper argues that we avoid these problems with an insurance regime; that financial firms outside the insurance regime should be disallowed from conducting maturity transformation (i.e., they would have to rely on term funding, not money market funding); and that we should develop functional criteria of eligibility for the insurance regime. (By the way, this is not the same thing as "extending" insurance to shadow banks.)

Anyway, these are things worth thinking about. I think the insurance approach needs more serious consideration than it has received -- it's a little lonely over here ...

Best,

Morgan Ricks

See here for nice summary of this approach and link to the underlying academic paper.

robert shumake

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